Reg.- Congress' comments after Mumbai terror attacks (wikileaks)

Tuesday, 23 December 2008, 13:26 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003228 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS EO 12958 DECL: 12/22/2018 TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, KISL, IN SUBJECT: CONGRESS PARTY STUNG PLAYING RELIGIOUS POLITICS WITH TERRORISM REF: MUMBAI 518 Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C)

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Summary: On the floor of parliament, Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram officially dismissed comments made by the Minority Affairs Minister A.R. Antulay that implied Hindutva elements may have been involved in the Mumbai attacks. Antulay sparked a political controversy on December 17 with comments insinuating that the killing of Maharashtra Anti-Terror Squad (ATS) Chief Hemant Karkare by the Mumbai terrorists was somehow linked to Karkare’s investigation of bombings in which radical Hindus are suspected (reftel). The outlandish comments suggested that somehow Hindutva elements were in league with the Mumbai attackers, or used the attacks as cover to kill Karkare. The opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) immediately called for Antulay’s resignation and protested with boisterous walkouts in parliament over the course of five days. Compounding matters, the Congress Party, after first distancing itself from the comments, two days later issued a contradictory statement which implicitly endorsed the conspiracy. During this time, Antulay’s completely unsubstantiated claims gained support in the conspiracy-minded Indian-Muslim community. Hoping to foster that support for upcoming national elections, the Congress Party cynically pulled back from its original dismissal and lent credence to the conspiracy. Regardless of Chidambaram’s dismissal (and Antulay’s party-ordered retraction), the Indian Muslim community will continue to believe they are unfairly targeted by law enforcement and that those who investigate the truth are silenced. The entire episode demonstrates that the Congress Party will readily stoop to the old caste/religious-based politics if it feels it is in its interest. End Summary. Killed in Mumbai Attacks, Karkare Led Investigation into “Hindu Terror” ---------------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Indian Minorities Affairs Minister A.R. Antulay’s sparked controversy on December 17 with comments insinuating that the killing of Maharashtra Anti-Terror Squad (ATS) Chief Hemant Karkare by the Mumbai terrorists was somehow linked to Karkare’s investigation of “Hindu terrorists.” Two of the Mumbai terrorists gunned down Karkare, and his ATS colleagues Additional Commissioner of Police Ashok Kamte and Inspector Vijay Salaskar the first night of attacks, November 26. The three officers were killed as they reached a hospital the terrorists entered after attacking the Mumbai train station.
 ¶3. (U) As Maharashtra ATS Chief, Karkare led the investigation into the September 2008 Malegaon blasts which claimed the lives of six people. Initially the police suspected Muslim terrorists. However, authorities recently arrested eleven Hindus, including an Indian Army Lieutenant Colonel. Police identified five of those arrested as having ties to the BJP’s youth wing in their earlier years. Two others had ties to a recent addition to the Sangh Parivar family of Hindu nationalist organizations. Antulay’s Comments ------------------
¶4. (U) On December 17, even as a solemn debate on the Mumbai attacks and counterterrorism was taking place in parliament, Antulay made a series of public comments drawing attention to a possible link between Karkare’s killing and his investigation. He offered no evidence to back-up his claims. -- “Superficially speaking they had no reason to kill Karkare. Whether he was a victim of terrorism or terrorism plus something, I do not know.” -- “Karkare found that there are non Muslims involved in the NEW DELHI 00003228 002 OF 002 acts of terrorism during his investigations in some cases. Any person going to the roots of terrorism has always been the target.” -- “Unfortunately his end came. It may be a separate inquiry how his end came.” -- “There is more than what meets the eyes.” Congress Party Dismisses... ---------------------------
¶5. (U) Most Congress Party leaders quickly disassociated the Party from Atulay’s comments. Congress Party spokesman Abishek Singhvi told the press, “We do not accept the innuendo and the aspersions cast. This should be the end of the matter. The Congress does not agree with Antulay’s statement.” Another Congress Party spokesman, Manish Tiwari, followed the next day with, “The Congress in any manner does not endorse Antulay’s views.” Just as quickly BJP leaders called for Antulay to resign or be sacked. ...Then Equivocates... ----------------------

¶6. (U) However, on December 21 senior Congress leader Digvijay Singh told the media, “I don’t think Antulay made a mistake. What he asked for is a probe. What is objectionable in his statement?” Two days earlier the Congress-led government of Maharashtra rejected a demand for an inquiry into Karkare’s death. The opposition BJP took exception to both the substance of Antulay’s comments and the Congress Party’s inconsistent response. Shouting slogans, the BJP staged a walkout in the parliament three days in a row and demanded a formal clarification from the government. Emboldened by the equivocation, Antulay refused to apologize or retract his statements and said they reflected the views of a large segment of the Muslim population. ...And Finally Dismisses ------------------------
¶7. (U) After taking flack for nearly a week, the Congress Party finally gave its official view when Home Minister Chidambaram stated in parliament, “There is no truth whatsoever in the suspicion that there was conspiracy.” Chidambaram called Antulay’s comments “regrettable.” Shortly thereafter Antulay backed down and told the press, “For me the matter is settled.” He ruled out his resignation. Congress Party Plays Cynical Politics -------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Comment: While the killing of three high level law enforcement officers during the Mumbai attacks is a remarkable coincidence, the Congress Party’s initial reaction to Antulay’s outrageous comments was correct. But as support seemed to swell among Muslims for Antulay’s unsubstantiated claims, crass political opportunism swayed the thinking of some Congress Party leaders. What’s more, the party made the cynical political calculation to lend credence to the conspiracy even after its recent emboldening state elections victories. The party chose to pander to Muslims’ fears, providing impetus for those in the Muslim community who will continue to play up the conspiracy theory. While cooler heads eventually prevailed within the Congress leadership, the idea that the party would entertain such outlandish claims proved once again that many party leaders are still wedded to the old identity politics. The seventy-nine year old Antulay was probably bewildered to find that his remarks, similar in vein to what he would have routinely made in the past to attack the BJP, created such a furor this time. End Comment. MULFORD

India's approach to crisis management in Afghanistan- Wikileaks

Reference ID- 10NEWDELHI163

Created- 2010-01-28 13:01

Released- 2010-12-02 21:09

Classification- CONFIDENTIAL

Origin- Embassy New Delhi

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 000163 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 01/18/2020 TAGS PREL, PGOV, PK, AF, IN SUBJECT: SRAP HOLBROOKE DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN WITH INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY RAO Classified By: Ambassador Timothy J. Roemer. Reasons: 1.4(B, D).

¶1. (C) Summary: In a January 18 meeting with Special Representative Richard Holbrooke, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao described the Indian effort in Afghanistan as focused on strengthening governance by building Afghan capacities. She said Indian engagement is transparent and should not be threatening to Pakistan. She urged U.S. pressure on Pakistan to break its ties to the terrorist groups and to permit Afghanistan’s economic links with India to grow. Rao said India needs some deliverables on terrorism before it can engage bilaterally with Pakistan. Holbrooke pledged transparency with India on U.S. activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He noted that the increase in U.S. troops has helped stabilize the security landscape, saying that the top security focus now is on unified training of Afghan army and police personnel. He identified agriculture as the highest civilian priority for the quick returns it promises, which Rao welcomed. Rao expressed Indian reservations on reintegration programs, saying they are unlikely to change Taliban thinking. Holbrooke drew a distinction between reintegration and reconciliation, saying that there will be no power sharing with elements of the Taliban. Rao was neutral on postponing Afghan parliamentary elections, saying the decision should be left to the Afghan government. She said that Iran could play a positive role and should be engaged in finding a solution in Afghanistan. End Summary. Transparency With India ----------------------- 

¶2. (SBU) Special Representative Holbrooke met with Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao for nearly two hours over breakfast on January 18 to exchange views on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Holbrooke said at the outset that the important underlying principle of his visits to India is the need for complete transparency on U.S. activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He noted that he comes with a clear vision of the centrality of India to the strategic landscape in the region. He reiterated that his portfolio explicitly excludes India, policy for which rests with SCA Blake and Ambassador Roemer. Holbrooke was accompanied in the meeting by Ambassador Roemer and SRAP Advisor Vali Nasr. Rao was joined by Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) Sinha and Joint Secretary (Americas) Gaitri Kumar. Holbrooke Briefing on Afghanistan ---------------------------------

 ¶3. (C) Holbrooke said that the mission in Afghanistan continues to be difficult but the situation has been stabilized, primarily as a result of the President’s politically courageous decision of more than tripling the number of American troops in the country. In his view, the Afghanistan Presidential election cast a shadow on 2009. The election was untidy, but it produced a legitimate President. Rao offered that there was less fraud and rigging in this election than in previous post-Taliban Afghan elections. 

¶4. (C) The agenda for 2010, according to Holbrooke, is to strengthen the government. On the security side the effort will be to improve the army and police, primarily through unified ISAF training instead of dispersed and uncoordinated training by many countries. Holbrooke described this as the most important part of the international challenge. Rao accepted his offer of a detailed joint State/Pentagon briefing on the redesigned training plan for the Afghan army and police. 

¶5. (C) Holbrooke said that on the civilian side, the number one priority is agriculture because it produces the quickest payoff. He noted that investment in mining, power, and other sectors is important but the gestation and payback periods are longer. Besides, he observed, Afghanistan has traditionally been an agricultural export country, with India as its biggest market. With revival of an agricultural credit bank and other agriculture support programs, the NEW DELHI 00000163 002 OF 004 international community expects a quick return in terms of employment and incomes in rural areas. Holbrooke described this as a sharp contrast with the previous administration, which focused on poppy eradication. On narcotics, the USG effort now is to target the traffickers and the kingpins, not ordinary farmers. 

¶6. (C) Rao responded that supporting Afghan agriculture is a high priority for India as well, with Joint Secretary Sinha on his way to Kabul on January 19 to explore opportunities to build Afghan capacities in this sector. She noted that the GOI is considering establishment of an agriculture college and enhanced training, in part through scholarships to Indian agricultural colleges. Holbrooke offered to arrange a briefing for Sinha in Kabul on the USG’s agriculture support programs and plans. Indian Approach to Afghanistan ------------------------------ 

¶7. (C) Rao described the Indian effort in Afghanistan as a focus on strengthening governance by building Afghan capacities through training and infrastructure such that the country can develop a functional administration. In her view, the international community should resist the temptation to micromanage in Afghanistan. Instead, the effort should be to build institutions and let them manage the country. Rao observed that India has the resources and the willingness to assist Afghanistan and is prepared to explore areas that the may assist the U.S. effort. 

¶8. (C) Rao observed that each year the GOI provides about 1,300 scholarship to Afghans for education and training and is considering increasing this number sharply. She noted that security assistance was minimal, limited to 150 training scholarships to Afghan army personnel in various Indian Army training facilities, including the Staff College. Rao readily agreed to Holbrooke’s request for a briefing on Indian training for Afghan security personnel, emphasizing that this engagement is completely transparent. She supported her argument by noting that the GOI had previously provided a detailed briefing on this at the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group meetings. “We have nothing to hide,” she declared. Holbrooke assured Rao that he is in favor of Indian assistance programs in Afghanistan and is not influenced by what he hears in Islamabad. Reintegration ------------- 

¶9. (C) Rao and Sinha raised grave concerns about Taliban reintegration plans currently under discussion. Sinha argued that no amount of monetary incentives would induce the Taliban to alter its core beliefs of intolerance and militancy. He was particularly troubled by the British plan which, in his view, takes Afghanistan back to the pre-1990s. Rao expressed skepticism that such a plan would work unless Pakistan changes its policy on supporting the Quetta Shura and other Taliban elements. She observed that it had failed to bring in the Maoists in Nepal and was likely to fail for similar reasons in Afghanistan. 

¶10. (C) Holbrooke explained that some of the anxiety stems from confusion between reintegration and reconciliation. He noted that the reintegration program is not a political negotiation designed to give Taliban elements a share of power. The United States cannot be a party to any such arrangement, in his view, because the Taliban is allied with the Al Qaeda and the social programs of the Taliban are unpalatable. He noted further that the Taliban leadership appears to have no interest in talking to the international community in Afghanistan. Holbrooke also allayed Indian concerns that UNSCR 1267 policy would be altered with respect to Taliban and LET leaders such as Mullah Omar, Gulubuddin Hekmatyar, and Hafiz Saeed. 

¶11. (C) Holbrooke said it is important that the Afghan NEW DELHI 00000163 003 OF 004 government have in place a program to respond to frequent ceasefire calls at the local level. Such a program should involve laying down of arms and commitments to participate peacefully in society. He outlined the public rollout of the reintegration plan, with a Karzai announcement soon, to be followed by the London conference where a reintegration fund would be established, and to be capped by a conference in Kabul where funding pledges will be solicited. He urged Indian support and contributions. Rao said reintegration could work if it is Afghan-led, if it is painstaking in its selection, and if it involves real commitments to respect human rights and the constitution. She underscored her skepticism by noting, “these are big if’s.” Parliamentary Elections ----------------------- 

¶12. (C) Holbrooke identified the upcoming Parliamentary election as the most important political event of 2010. He offered the USG view that the election be postponed to the fall because of inadequate preparation and insufficient ISAF troops on the ground to ensure a peaceful and smooth election in May. He noted that Afghan law allows for such changes in election dates. He requested India’s support for this proposal. Rao responded that it must remain the Afghan Government’s responsibility to make the call on postponement of elections. “Unlike Pakistan, we do not interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan,” she quipped with a smile. She offered Indian assistance in administering the elections. Pakistan Role in Afghanistan ---------------------------- 

¶13. (C) Rao said that Afghanistan has the potential to prosper as a hub or transit point for energy, agriculture and trade if it could be connected to its natural market in India. She said it was unfortunate that Pakistan does not allow this to happen. She asked that the U.S. apply pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting the Afghanistan Taliban and to allow Afghanistan to develop through trade and commercial links. Holbrooke responded that Pakistan views certain Taliban groups, particularly the Quetta Shura, as an insurance policy to protect its strategic interests in Afghanistan and it is not clear that anyone can easily influence Pakistan to turn on these groups, although the U.S. is exerting tremendous pressure. Rao said she was alarmed at this continued Pakistan support for terrorist groups, noting that the LET was “ideologically fused” with both the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network. As evidence, she pointed to the Haqqani group’s 2008 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. She was also disturbed at the length to which Pakistan had gone to exclude India from the Istanbul conference on Afghanistan, citing it as an example of unwarranted Pakistani insecurity over Indian intentions in Afghanistan. Citing the USG’s own difficulties in dealing with the Pakistan government, Holbrooke suggested that many people overestimate the U.S. influence in Pakistan. India-Pakistan Relations ----------------------- 

¶14. (C) Rao expressed concern that there has been a sharp increase in unseasonal Pakistan-inspired violence and preparation for violence. She pointed to incidents of cross-border shelling along the line of control and in Punjab, increased infiltration, and transfer of terrorist hardware. They are clearly trying to “stir the pot” in Kashmir, she added. In her view, Pakistan is trying to deflect attention to its eastern border from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where the focus ought to be. Yet, Rao argued, India has not turned its back to Pakistan but needs some Pakistani progress on terrorism to reengage. Holbrooke noted that India and Pakistan working together is obviously in the interests of the region and the international community. He said that Foreign Minister Qureshi was very pleased at the phone call with Foreign Minister Krishna. He reassured Rao that he understands NEW DELHI 00000163 004 OF 004 clearly where the U.S. strategic interests lie. Holbrooke and Special Advisor Vali Nasr briefed Rao on the evolving political landscape in Pakistan with a weakening President Zardari and the fluid dynamic between the various centers of power, including COAS Kayani, Prime Minister Gilani, PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif and Chief Justice Choudhary. Iran-Afghanistan; Iran-India ---------------------------- 

¶15. (C) In response to Holbrooke’s query, Rao and Sinha suggested that Iran could play a positive role in stability in Afghanistan. They cited Iran’s common border with Afghanistan, its strong links with the Hazara ethnic group and its economic and cultural connections as reasons for involving Iran in shaping a solution. She said that India was willing to play a helpful role in enabling Iran’s engagement with the international community and this had been conveyed by the Prime Minister to the Iranian Foreign Minister. India, however, does not want to be a mediator in any capacity, she declared. Rao said Iran-India relations were good -- civilizational ties, India’s large Shia community, petroleum trade -- but “not as good as you may expect” because Iran is difficult to deal with. China in South Asia ------------------- 

¶16. (C) Holbrooke and Rao agreed that the Chinese have a big interest in Afghanistan but it is focused on exploitation of the country’s natural resources. They also agreed that China does not use the influence it has in Pakistan to shape responsible Pakistani behavior. Referring to the U.S.-China joint statement issued during President Obama’s China visit, Rao disclosed that Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao had told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Copenhagen that China has no intention of playing any mediating role in South Asia. 

¶17. (U) SRAP Holbrooke has cleared this message. ROEMER
source- Wikileaks

Summary of Meeting of NSA(US) James Jones with Defense Minister A.K. Antony

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003044


Reference ID 08NEWDELHI3044
Created 2008-12-02 15:03
Released 2010-11-30 21:09
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Origin Embassy New Delhi

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SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 12/02/2018 TAGS PGOV, PTER, PHUM, PREL, PINR, KDEM, KISL, PK, IN SUBJECT: MUMBAI ATTACKS UPDATE: DIPLOMATS IN DELHI DELIVER UNITED MESSAGES REF: A. NEW DELHI 3025 B. NEW DELHI 3024 C. NEW DELHI 3018 D. MUMBAI 550 Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

¶1. (C) Summary: Diplomatic missions in Delhi have agreed to offer a more sympathetic message to the Indians rather than pound on the government for its massive intelligence failure. Evidence that Pakistani-based extremist group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) was the culprit is still not out in the open, although the question being asked now is whether Pakistan’s Intelligence Agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was directly involved in the attack. Dipomatic missions in Delhi are praising Delhi for its restraint while advising Pakistan that now is the time to collaborate. End Summary. Offering Only Sympathy and Support ---------------------------------- 

¶2. (C) At a 2 December meeting with counterparts from the Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealand High Commissions, these diplomats communicated details of the controlled approach their respective missions in Delhi have taken in their responses to India’s reaction to the Mumbai attacks. They concluded that any offers of assistance should be made carefully to avoid being interpreted by the Indians as politically motivated or attempts to monitor their actions. Delhi-based missions are taking extra care at this stage to not get sucked into the blame game Pakistan and India are currently playing. 

¶3. (C) The EU (diplomatic mission heads) are scheduled for a strategic dialogue with India on 5 December to discuss what type of support India would feel comfortable receiving; in addition, the EU plans to send to Delhi a counter-terrorism coordinator in January. 

¶4. (C) The French Ambassador, according to the British High Commission, called the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors (unbeknownst to other EU partners) to discuss assistance to the Indians. President Sarkozy is expected to call Prime Minister Singh to express his sympathy and to offer cooperation at a suitable level. 

¶5. (SBU) The Australian Prime Minister in his speech to his parliament said Australia “stands with India at this time” and offered any assistance that their “friends” in New Delhi may require. He stressed the importance of tracking down those responsible for the planning and execution of the Mumbai attacks, singling out LeT as an separatist militant group which has been a threat to India for a long time, but saying it is too early to speculate on who the perpetrators were. The Million Dollar Question --------------------------- 

¶6. (C) While Indian press continues to pin blame on Pakistan, observers and diplomats in Delhi are asking the same question: was the ISI behind the Mumbai attacks? While there are clear links between the attacks’ perpetrators and the extremist group LeT, and likewise, there are links between LeT and the ISI, there is no clear evidence yet to suggest that ISI directed or facilitated the attacks, according to the British High Commission. Demarching the Indians and Pakistanis ------------------------------------- 

¶7. (C) A British diplomat told us that UK Foreign Secretary Miliband urged restraint to External Affairs Minister NEW DELHI 00003044 002 OF 002 Mukherjee when they spoke on 1 December. The call took place only after many delays on the GOI’s part. Mukherjee apparently disavowed any interest in raising tensions further, but insisted that Pakistan must take action in response to India,s demands. Our contact stressed that the UK had been very direct in presenting India and Pakistan with specific information regarding those responsible for the attacks. She also noted that the list of names the Indians had put on the “Most Wanted Criminals List” that had been passed to Islamabad included figures such as fugitive crime lord Dawood Ibrahim and Jaish-e-Mohammed Chief Maulana Azhar, who had been on prior lists the Indians had submitted. In her view, this took away from the focus on LeT members implicated in the Mumbai attacks. 

¶8. (C) Narayanan, according to British diplomats, delivered the message that he understands Pakistan’s civilian government has no control over the ISI or the army. He said India is not blaming the Pakistani government. The Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still waiting on the Pakistanis to provide the name of the ISI Director they plan to send as well as a date. 

¶9. (C) The Australian High Commission delivered the message to the Pakistanis that this is a watershed and cooperation with the Indians now is crucial. The Australians have praised the Indians for the past restraint they have shown toward Pakistan and offered assistance, which was “politely denied”, according to an Australian diplomat. Zardari Cornered ---------------- 

¶10. (C) An official in the Pakistani High Commission in Delhi told Poloff that he held the Indian press responsible for any deterioration in the Indo-Pak relationship. Following the Indian press coverage which misrepresented the potential visit of the ISI Chief and complicated potential cooperation between the two governments, this diplomat said Zardari’s options became more limited and the GOP felt it had no other choice than to backpedal on its initial offer, made before the Mumbai attacks, to send its ISI Chief to India. MULFORD

Source- Wikileaks

India's view of Pakistan in words of Indian foreign secretary- Shiv Shankar Menon

Reference ID 09NEWDELHI288

Created 2009-02-17 08:08

Released 2010-11-30 21:09

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

Origin Embassy New Delhi

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000288 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 02/16/2017 TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, IN SUBJECT: INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY: “HUGE STAKE” IN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE’S SUCCESS Classified By: AMB David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 

¶1. (C) Summary. In a meeting between Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and Special Representative Richard Holbrooke on February 16, Menon: -- stated that India “has a huge stake” in the Special Representative’s success in his new role and promised to support Holbrooke’s efforts publicly to alleviate negative media speculation about the Special Representative’s mandate; -- gave his assessment that the intentions and capabilities of the Pakistan Army were the key determinants of Pakistan,s internal situation and the cause of friction between India and Pakistan; -- said that India wishes to collaborate closely with the U.S. on Afghanistan, and offered support for U.S. views on the suitability of an August 20 election date; -- suggested that after consulting internally, he may travel to Washington to provide GOI input into the U.S. review of Afghanistan policy; and -- provided a brief on the GOI’s initial reaction to Pakistan’s response to the Mumbai terror attacks. End Summary. 

¶2. (C) Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, accompanied by Ambassador, met February 16 with Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon. Also in attendance from the U.S. side were Paul Jones, Deputy for Holbrooke; Ashley Bommer, Representative Holbrooke’s assistant; and an Embassy notetaker; the Indian side also included Joint Secretary (Americas) Gaitri Kumar and Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) TCA Raghvan. Holbrooke explained his responsibilities as Special Representative and emphasized the importance of Indian views in the formulation of the new administration,s Afghanistan and Pakistan policy. He also provided Menon with a brief readout of his trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan 

¶3. (C) Menon cited the numerous times he had worked both publicly and privately with Holbrooke in the past, and said he was very happy to see Holbrooke in his new incarnation. The Indian government, too, was pleased with Holbrooke’s appointment, he stated, adding “We have a huge stake in your success in this role.” He agreed with Holbrooke’s assessment that in regard to the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan “you can’t solve one without the other.”

 ¶4. (C) The Indian government was aware of the suspicions the media had created about Special Representative Holbrooke’s mandate (i.e., that it included Kashmir), Menon said. While the media would always speculate, Menon promised that the GOI would publicly support Holbrooke’s efforts, adding that it would repeat the message “India has a huge stake in your success” in its public comments. 

¶5. (C) Turning to Pakistan, Menon observed that the mood there had deteriorated over the past year, saying it had gone from euphoria after the return of a civilian government to worries over security and the economy. The U.S. has influence, however, “where it matters most,” Menon said, referring to the Pakistan Army, arguing that most of the problems in Pakistan can be traced to the capacity and intentions of Pakistan’s military. Not only must Pakistan’s army shift its attention from east to west, Menon asserted, but it must also cut its links to jihadi organizations, who have gone global over the past five years. Supporting Pakistan’s army is not the answer, he said, suggesting that changing its operating assumptions would be more effective. Menon noted that the Indians had felt last week’s meeting at the Munich Security Conference between National Security Advisor MK Narayanan and General Petraeus had been especially productive. 

¶6. (C) Menon pointed out that in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, India had consciously not attempted to take any measures to destabilize Pakistan’s civilian government, and had made every effort to continue trade and travel relations. However, Pakistan’s Army continued to make things difficult for India, through ceasefire violations, infiltrations and continued support for terrorist groups. NEW DELHI 00000288 002 OF 002 Menon noted that India, in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, had consciously not built up troops on the border with Pakistan, as it had following the 2001 attack on its Parliament. 

¶7. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Holbrooke noted that the focus now was on the elections. He lauded India for the effective contribution it had made to Afghanistan reconstruction, which Menon said is now up to $1.5 billion. Menon acknowledged Pakistani suspicions about India,s intentions in Afghanistan and explained that India has made numerous efforts over the past few years to try to allay Pakistan’s concerns, only to be rebuffed. Menon said that he, as High Commissioner, had offered to President Musharraf to sit down and explain exactly what India was doing in Afghanistan, without even asking for a reciprocal explanation from Pakistan, but that Pakistan officials -- not just Musharraf -- “have avoided it in every way.” 

¶8. (C) India has no interest in any specific candidate in Afghan elections, Menon stated, but believes the upcoming election process should not add to instability. Equally important is that the election process is credible, therefore making Afghanistan’s democracy credible. Menon noted that Afghan Lower House Speaker Mohammad Yunis Qanuni was currently in Delhi, and said India supported the Election Commission,s proposal for August 20 polling. Menon stated that the GOI was also planning to tell Qanuni that controversy over the exact date of the election should not be allowed “to bring the house down,” adding that to do so would only be in the Taliban’s interest. Holbrooke urged Menon to tell Qanuni to accept the August 20 election date. (Note: Menon offered to brief Post on the Qunani meeting, and Post will report septel on any readout provided. End Note.) 

¶9. (C) Responding to Holbrooke,s brief of the Afghanistan policy review currently underway in the USG, Menon said he would consult with his government on what would be the best way for India to provide input. He suggested that, after consultations, he would like to travel to Washington for high level talks with the new team. Menon assured Holbrooke, that on the issue of Indian cooperation with the U.S. on Afghanistan, we could be assured that India wished to work closely with us. 

¶10. (C) Menon asked if the U.S. was considering including Iran in a Core Group on Afghanistan. Holbrooke referred to his interview with Tolo TV where he emphasized the need for all of Afghanistan’s neighbors to be part of the solution, but said no policy decisions had been made. Menon said he believed a contact group did not have to be formally set up yet, but rather if we “let it cook,” it would form itself. Menon noted the interest China has had in such a group for the past two years, and added that Iran has been signaling to India for the last four months that it was interested. 

¶11. (C) Menon offered an initial GOI assessment of the Pakistani response to India’s dossier on the Mumbai terror attacks. Saying that it was “remarkable that we got this far,” Menon thanked the U.S. for its role in pressing Pakistan to act. Still, Menon maintained, Pakistan has further to go to bring justice to the perpetrators of the attack, and it is not clear whether Pakistan will continue on this positive track or, citing the Daniel Pearl case, recede when public pressure wanes. Menon also speculated that many of the “30 questions” submitted by Pakistan were added after the investigation by politicians in response to domestic pressures. “We haven’t reached the point of no return yet” for Pakistan’s government to positively conclude the investigation, Menon stated. Menon also offered that he did not believe the Mumbai attacks themselves would play a major role in India’s upcoming elections, because efforts to capitalize politically on such a heinous event would likely backfire on any political party. 

¶12. (SBU) Ambassador Holbrooke has cleared this message. MULFORD

COLD START- India's plan of action against pakistan (Wikileaks)

Reference ID 10NEWDELHI295

Created 2010-02-16 13:01

Released 2010-11-30 21:09

Classification SECRET

Origin Embassy New Delhi

VZCZCXYZ0006

OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNE #0295/01 0471345

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 161345Z FEB 10

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9518

INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6678

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

RHMCSUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T NEW DELHI 000295 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2020 TAGS PREL, PTER, MOPS, IN, PK SUBJECT: COLD START - A MIXTURE OF MYTH AND REALITY REF: IIR 6 844 0101 10 (COLD START - A DAO PERSPECTIVE) Classified By: Ambassador Tim Roemer. Reason: 1.4 (b,d). 

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Indian Army’s “Cold Start Doctrine” is a mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints, but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation of Pakistan. Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response. It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not publicly embraced Cold Start and GOI uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future implementation by any government. If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would encounter mixed results. The GOI failed to implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of the GOI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice. At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan. Taken together, these factors underline that the value of the doctrine to the GOI may lie more in the plan’s existence than in any real world application. End Summary. What It Is and What It Is Not ----------------------------- 

¶2. (S/NF) As we understand it, Cold Start is an operational plan devised by the Indian Army and designed to make a rapid and limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan over some event, such as a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response. Cold Start is not a plan for the comprehensive invasion or occupation of Pakistan. Cold Start is said to have been formulated after the Indian Army’s slow and drawn-out 2002 mobilization in response to the fatal 2001 Pakistan-linked terror attack on the Indian Parliament. The lengthy process of mobilization, lack of strategic and operational flexibility, and the resulting lack of any element of surprise drew criticism from Indian politicians and opinion leaders, which prompted Indian Army planners to devise Cold Start. (See Reftel for further details on Cold Start’s genesis). 

¶3. (S/NF) In order to avoid the Indian Army’s slow and lumbering military mobilization process and preserve the element of surprise in attack, Cold Start attacks could begin within 72 hours after the attack order has been given, and would be led by armored spearheads launched from prepared forward positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. As described, the plan emphasizes speed and overwhelming firepower: armored formations and accompanying infantry would advance into eastern Pakistan with limited goals in terms of distance and in terms of duration. Although the plan reportedly has a significant air support component, it is unclear to us how much joint versus parallel planning has taken place. We have not heard of a major operational role for the Indian Navy or parallel sea-launched attacks. (Reftel provides further analysis of the military aspects of Cold Start doctrine and implementation). 

¶4. (S/NF) A positive attribute of Cold Start from the Indian perspective is that the short 72-hour time period between decision and attack could shield the GOI from international pressure to refrain from taking military action against Pakistan. India’s prolonged 2002 mobilization period gave the international community notice of Indian troop movements and allowed plenty of time for a series of Western interlocutors to lobby GOI leaders. Even if the plan is never actually implemented -- and there is considerable question as to GOI intent to ever implement it -- news of Cold Start’s existence has already paid dividends to Indian policymakers by providing reassurance to the Indian public that the GOI has the means to punish Pakistan for attacks on Indian soil without triggering potential mutually-assured nuclear destruction. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in theory may have some deterrent value. Prospects for Cold Start ------------------------ 

¶5. (S/NF) As noted above, GOI intent to ever actually implement Cold Start is very much an open question. The Cold Start doctrine was announced in April 2004 by the BJP-led government that was replaced shortly thereafter by the Manmohan Singh government, which has not since publicly embraced Cold Start. A political green-light to implement Cold Start, fraught as it is with potential nuclear consequences, would involve a highly opaque decision-making process and would likely necessitate broad political consensus, a factor that could prolong the time between a precipitating event such as a Pakistan-linked terror attack and Cold Start deployment (which in turn could reduce the element of surprise). We lack firm details of the decision-making process that the political leadership would use in the event of an incident that would trigger consideration of Cold Start or other military action against Pakistan. The precise function of the Cabinet Committee on Security in ratifying decisions to take military action, the character of the military’s advisory responsibilities to the Cabinet, the possible ad hoc nature of decision-making in the upper levels of the Indian government and the role of Congress Party figures like Sonia Gandhi in this process are not clearly understood. 

¶6. (S/NF) If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would likely encounter very mixed results. Indian forces could have significant problems consolidating initial gains due to logistical difficulties and slow reinforcement. Reftel sets forth in detail the various resource challenges that India would have to overcome, challenges that range from road and rail transportation to ammunition supply. In addition, Cold Start’s reliance on swift mobile advance would have to contend with a large number of built-up populated areas in Pakistan that the Indian Army did not have to face in 1971, the last time it advanced in force into Pakistani Punjab and Sindh. 

¶7. (S/NF) Indian leaders no doubt realize that, although Cold Start is designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear response, they can not be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain from such a response. Even in the absence of a Pakistani nuclear response, GOI leaders are aware also that even a limited Indian incursion into Pakistan will likely lead to international condemnation of Indian action and a resulting loss of the moral high ground that GOI leaders believe India enjoys in its contentious relationship with Pakistan. Comment -------

¶8. (S/NF) We think that the November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai and its immediate aftermath provide insight into Indian and Pakistani thinking on Cold Start. First, the GOI refrained from implementing Cold Start even after an attack as audacious and bloody as the Mumbai attack, which calls into serious question the GOI’s willingness to actually adopt the Cold Start option. Second, the Pakistanis have known about Cold Start since 2004, but this knowledge does not seem to have prompted them to prevent terror attacks against India to extent such attacks could be controlled. This fact calls into question Cold Start’s ability to deter Pakistani mischief inside India. Even more so, it calls into question the degree of sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders to USG officials. Cold Start is not India’s only or preferred option after a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all or could pursue one of several other possible options. Finally, several very high level GOI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported, or advocated for this doctrine. One of these officials is former National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, who has recently been replaced. While the army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is less clear. ROEMER
source wikileaks (http://213.251.145.96)

Campus gossips

Principal & Dean

Dr.Vikram Kumar is the 18th principal for RMC. He took over his responsibilities as principal 1st July 2010. Vikram Kumar completed his M.B.B.S in SV Medical College, Tirupathi. Later he completed his M.D in paediatrics at P.G.I in Chandigarh. In 1983, he was appointed as Assistant Professor in RMC, GGH and in 2000 he was promoted as Associate Professor. Later in 2005 he was promoted as Professor and Department Head. He is married  to Dr. V. Rama Devi also a professor at G.G.H. Kakinada. He is also a recipient of best teacher award given by the state Govt. of Andhra Pradesh.

college details

Rangaraya Medical College
Govt/Private- Government
Status- Affiliated
MBBS Seats- 150
University- Dr.NTR UNIVERSITY OF HEALTH SCIENCES, ANDHRA PRADESH


List of medical colleges in Andhra pradesh- Click here


COURSES OFFERED

Medical Degrees	Medical Diplomas
M.D.(General Mecicine)
M.D.(Pediatrics)	D.C.H.
M.D.(Anesthesia)	D.A.
M.D.(Pulmonary Medicine)	D.T.C.D.
M.D.(D.V.L)	D(D.V.L)
M.D.(R.D.)	D.M.R.D.
M.D.(Psychiatry)	D.P.M
M.D.(Radio Therapy)
	D. Lep.
Surgery Degrees	Surgery Diploma
M.S.(General Surgery)
M.S.(Orthopadecs)	Diploma in Orthopadecs
M.S.(Optholmology)	D.O.
M.S.(E.N.T)	D.L.O.
M.D.(O & G)	D.G.O.
Non Clinical Degrees	Non Clinical Diplomas
M.D.(Anatomy)
M.D.(Physio.)
M.D.(Biochem.)
M.D.(Path)	D.C.P.
M.D.(Micro. Bio)
M.D.(Pharma)
M.D.(F.M.)
M.D.(SPM)	D.P.H.

Address:
Rangaraya Medical College,
Pithapuram Road,
Kakinada - 533033,
East Godavari District,
Andhra pradesh


Contact Numbers-

college photos 3

college photos 1

college photos 2

funny bone

few questions faced by indians abroad and funny answers

Are all Indians vegetarian?
Yes. Even tigers are vegetarian in India.

Does India have cars?
No. We ride elephants to work. The government is trying to encourage ride-sharing schemes.

What does that red dot on women's forehead mean?
Well, in ancient times, Indian men used to practice archery skills by target practicing by aiming at their wife's red dot. In fact, that is one of the reasons why they had many wives. You see, once they mastered the art of archery and hit the target....

Does India have TV?
No. We only have cable.

Are you a Hindi?
Yes. I am spoken everyday in Northern India.

Do you speak Hindu?
Yes, I also speak Jewish, Islam and Christianity.

Is it true that everyone there is very corrupt?
Yes, in fact, I had to bribe my parents so that they would let me go to school.

India is very hot, isn't it?
It is so hot there that all the water boils spontaneously. That is why tea is such a popular drink in India.

Indians cannot eat beef, huh?
Cows provide milk which is a very essential part of Indian diet. So eating cows is forbidden. However in order to decrease the population of the country, the government is trying to encourage everyone to eat human meat.

Why do you sometimes wear Indian clothes to work?
I prefer it to coming naked.

Don’t lead a good life… Lead a great one…

Leading a life of regrets, waking up everyday and cursing yourself because you are looking forward to a routine, dull, boring, monotonous day ahead, doing a job you are not meant for but you are doing it just for the money, bearing insults from people  when you know deep down inside that you deserve better.

The above mentioned complex of signs are something many people face everyday. What do we do about it??? Nothing.  That’s where most of the people continue to drown themselves into this pit of depression and self regret.

From now on ask yourselves… what the hell is this??? Why should I continue to do this when I know that I deserve better. Why I should I stay silent while I am mocked at by everyone??If you suffer with these complex of signs its time to realize that you can change it all and make your everyday living worthwile. Instead of waking up to a tasteless day, you will be waking up to a spicy energetic and beautiful day.

To achieve this first you need to sit with a clear mind and think. Think about what you’ve always dreamed of doing. You may have dreamed of doing many things. Decide which of these things is best for you . it is upto you to decide the best path for you. no one is going to tell with a cent percent confidence that a particular job/career/ course/decision  will be good for you. You and you alone can make the best judgement from a list of choices which you have dreamed of doing.

Once you have decided what is best for you. Make it your Aim. Tell yourself “I badly need this and I must be willing to sacrifice anything to achieve this target.” Start working on it. Do not deviate yourselves. Get ready to give your 200 percent towards achieving your goal. Ignore all factors which tend to pull you off your path towards attaining a life which is completely in your control. Remember if you think you can, you can.

 

A main obstacle to your aims and ambitions is the words of people around you. It is a part of everyday life to interact with people around you. Interaction and inter-personal relations are the foundations for any society.  But on this journey towards your dream. People will mock you, lie to you or even worse Dump you if you are in a relationship. It is imperative that you keep your head cool and think straight inspite of horrible setbacks caused by people and their words. Just tell yourself that these people will not have the courage to stand before you when you burn midnight oil and make your dreams come true.

Following your dream and achieving what you have always dreamed of gives you the ultimate satisfaction.It’s not the money you’ve amassed over the years, one night stands, drugs or alcohol that make your life more enjoyable.  It is the respect you have earned by the work and service you have done that will make you be remembered and cherished by everyone around you. This respect will be earned if you do your job successfully. To enjoy the taste of success you need to do your job whole heartedly. Doing your job whole heartedly requires you to think of your job not as a burden, not as something you do just to earn money. Choose a job that you’ve dreamed of doing all your life. This job will automatically bring out the best in you because it was your dream and you worked for it and you feel at home when you do that particular job.Whenever you feel at home doing a job that you dreamed of  you will excel in it no matter what comes in your way.

On a closing note, I would like to say.

Fulfill your dreams.  

Live up to every moment

Achieve your goals.

Earn self respect.

Then your life will not be a good one… It will be a great one.

awareness programme on road safety@RMC, Kakinada

hi guys! there's good news for non liscenced bikers,

road safety awareness programme along with liscence mela

is being conducted tomorrow(30/10/2010)

@

CLINICAL LECTURE GALLERY (SPM GALLERY)

GGH, KAKINADA 

at 11:00 am

the programme is being attended by 

Superintrendent of Police, DSPs, officials of Police(L&O) and traffic police

RTO officials, driving inspectors etc..

Dr. Vikram Kumar, Principal (RMC) will preside over the function

Superindent GGH: Dr. M.B.R. Sarma will be Chief guest on the occasion

All medicos who are not possessing driving liscences are requested to apply for the same tomorrow.

the first part of the video posted by meticulous mavericks for their convocation



the second part of the video posted by meticulous mavericks for their convocation


the third part of the video posted by meticulous mavericks for their convocation

sweet memories

comment on ur sweet memories in the colege on this post. Also contact me if you have anything to share with us photos, videos etc.

an awesome dance performance by uday and valli babu of clarions



golden words by Dr. V. Chandrasekhar sir, vice principal on the occasion of his retirement- WE WILL NEVER FORGET YOU SIR

RETIREMENT FUNCTION 2

a dance by bilal of spartans and srinivas of clarion batch






an awesome dance performance by girls of spartans batch

RETIREMENT FUNCTION OF Dr. R. Pratap sir, Principal AND Dr. V. Chandrasekhar, Vice Principal

the function also marked the celebration of mini sports day of our college and different prizes were given for cricket, basketball and football

a poem by our beloved Ravi Babu sir of SPM on the occasion of the retirement of principal Dr. R. Pratap sir and vice principal Dr. V. Chandrasekhar, Rangaraya Medical College



a dance by girls of clarion batch

Marks of SECOND MBBS- MARCH 2010

The following is the provisional list of registered numbers of all the successful candidates at SECOND M.B., B.S., Examinations held in MARCH/APRIL, 2010.

MARKS OF CLASS TOPPER

Reg No 0704003 Name ALLU HARSHAVARDHINI DIV FIRST

Subject          Theory + Orl        Practical             Int Asses           Grand Total
                     MAX  SEC          MAX   SEC          MAX  SEC            MAX    SEC
Pharmac       95      71             25      17           30      17              150    105

Micro           95      78            25      20            30      22             150    120

Path              95      74           25       22           30      21             150    117
Forensic        50       40          30       24          20      15              100    79

Result PASS     Total 421





PASSED IN FIRST CLASS WITH DISTINCTION

0704003           0704079
0704093           0704127


PASSED IN FIRST CLASS

0704005   0704013     0704014      0704017
0704020    0704024    0704027      0704028     0704032

0704033    0704035    0704036      0704037     0704040

0704042     0704043    0704048     0704057     0704058

0704059      0704060    0704063     0704065    0704066

0704067     0704068     0704070     0704071    0704072

0704074     0704078     0704080     0704081     0704082

0704086     0704087     0704088     0704090    0704094

0704097     0704099     0704103     0704104    0704110
0704119     0704122     0704123     0704125     0704126

0704130      0704136    0704137      0704141     0704150



PASSED IN SECOND CLASS

0404002    0404003
0604041    0604103     0704001     0704002     0704007

0704008     0704010    0704012     0704015     0704016

0704018     0704021    0704022     0704025     0704026

0704030     0704031    0704038     0704039     0704041

0704044    0704046     0704047     0704050     0704052

0704054     0704056    0704061     0704062     0704064

0704076     0704077    0704083     0704084     0704085

0704089     0704092    0704095     0704098     0704101
0704105     0704106    0704107     0704108     0704109

0704111     0704113    0704114     0704115     0704117

0704118     0704121    0704124    0704128      0704129

0704131     0704132    0704133    0704134     0704135

0704138     0704139    0704140    0704142     0704143

0704146     0704147    0704148    0704149     0704151

UNITED WE STAND... DIVIDED WE FALL........... The organ...isin MARSHALLS

a few cherished moments

UN FORGETTABLE DANCE BY...........:-) Guess if u can....


The Camp Fire......Beat the cold

mens hostel day 2010

THE STAGE

THE POSTERS

   MAGADHEERA (The ultimate showdown of The passing out batch)

          THE ARRANGEMENTS